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INTEREST GROUPS AND 
GOVERNMENT POLICY IN MALAYSIA 
by Fred R. von der Mehden 
The traditional manner of analyzing the functions of organized private 
interest groups in modern democratic systems has primarily centered upon 
an assessment of the efforts of organizations to influence the input functions 
of government, i.e., to study the means by which various types of pressure 
groups attempt to create an impact upon voters, legislators, the executive 
branch and, in some cases, the judiciary. Analysis has concentrated upon 
methods of influencing the formulation of laws and regulations whose effect 
might be to  aid or injure the organization involved. In this study of the 
interaction between the public and private sectors in Malaysia, I seek to 
analyze the extent to which this pattern of influence is also present in a 
developing democratic system. I t  is the contention of this paper that, in 
fact, the Malaysian firm or organization is primarily interested in influencing 
the output rather than the input functions of government; i.e., it seeks to 
decide how laws and regulations already formulated shall affect the organi- 
zation. Thus, influence is directed more at the implemeritation of laws and 
rules by the administrative elements of government. In  an  effort to elucidate 
this practice, the study will investigate types of contacts between government 
and the private sector, attitudes of the private sector towards government, 
and methods of influence. The focus will be primarily upon the industrializa- 
tion and development policies of the Malaysian government, both programs 
with income re-distribution goals. 
Malaysia provides an interesting comparison with western democratic 
states. It is one of the few Afro-Asian countries with competitive political 
parties, a working parliamentary system, and public support of both Western 
and national entrepreneurial activities. A pluralist society, Malaysia accepts 
economic and political activities by private organizations within certain 
constitutional limits. Thus there exist functional interest groups representing 
various economic and social activities: tin and rubber producers, Chinese 
and Indian chambers of commerce, and educational organizations, as well 
as private firms. Like the United States, but unlike many of its Asian neigh- 
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bors, Malaysia does not have functional group representation as such in its 
legislature. Although official interest groups, particularly parties and the 
civil service, have a prominent part in the political system, this paper will 
concentrate on private organizations. 
METHOD 
The basic assertions made in this paper have been derived from two sur- 
veys carried out in Malaysia during 1973. The first was of two hundred 
twenty-eight of the thousand largest companies in West Malaysia and seven- 
teen associations (such as chambers of commerce) throughout West Malay- 
sia. In 82% of the encounters, a top-level man in the organization was 
interviewed. The sample was selected to reflect geographic distribution 
(somewhat weighted in order to obtain representation from the entire 
peninsula), ownership (local, foreign, and joint enterprises), race of owner, 
and types of businesses (associations, processing of primary products, 
western trading companies, Asian trading companies, food manufacturing, 
engineering, other manufacturing, service industries, and financial institu- 
tions).' The survey had a high proportion of open-end questions, which 
were coded after field work was completed. The survey sought answers on 
sources of information on government policies, type and frequency of 
contact with various elements of government, awareness and attitudes 
toward Malaysian government economic policies (with particular emphasis 
upon the New Economic Policy*), and problems in dealing with government. 
The second survey was of thirty-six firms in two industrial estates and one 
Free Trade Zone in Penang. This was an in-depth survey carried out with 
the aid of students from the Universiti Sains Malaysia, and it incorporated 
firm histories. Managers or owners and a sample of workers were interviewed 
to assess their experiences in the development of new industrial enterprises 
or the expansion of old ones. Two general lines of questioning were the 
focus of this survey: 1) the experiences of regionally based firms with govern- 
ment, and 2) the extent to which the industrial development program in 
Penang related to the overall Malaysian plan to eradicate poverty and raise 
the standards of the Malays through the NEP. Beyond these two surveys 
analysis was also made of membership of boards of companies and the 
history of industrial development in Malaysia; additional interviewing took 
place in 1974-75. The research design was developed to provide economic 
and social analysts in the Rice University Income Distribution Program 
with the political bases for decision-making on economic policies in Malaysia. 
Interviews in both cases were carried out by university students trained 
and supervised by the author and/or a commercial survey firm. Consider- 
able care was taken to allay suspicions of firms, and prior to interviews 
managers were informed by letter as to  the nature of the study and the 
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anonymity of their answers. A high percentage agreed to participate although 
local Chinese were less willing than other managers to be involved. Inter- 
views were given in the language of the respondent and generally lasted fifty 
minutes in the national sample. The Penang study respondents were often 
interviewed several times over a four week period. 
INFORMATION FOR DECISION-MAKING 
In order that groups be able to influence policy, it is necessary that they 
have access to data on government policies and regulations, and the ability 
and desire to employ that information. A very high percentage (87%) of 
firms interviewed noted that they kept informed of national government 
matters. On close scrutiny, however, a pattern can be discerned which was 
mirrored throughout the interviews. Knowledge and use of information 
about government programs in Malaysia are weighted in favor of firms 
characterized by non-Chinese, foreign, or  joint venture ownership, and by 
residence around the capital city state of Selangor. While variations are not 
great, they do display significant geographic and ownership biases, particu- 
larly if such attempts to keep informed were regular. 
TABLE 1 
MANAGEMENT I FORMED OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MATTERS 
(In percentages) 
Ownership Rest 
Local Foreign Joint Selangor W. Malaysia Chinese Others 
Do keep informed 83 90 95 91 83 82 97 
Do not keep informed 17 10 5 9 17 18 3 
Informed on regular basis 68 81 89 79 70 65 92 
Informed irregularly 15 10 6 12 13 16 5 
A much higher percentage of managers in firms with foreign ownership 
was involved in gathering and maintaining knowledge than the percentage 
of managers in localIy owned firms, underlining the importance to such 
businesses of regular information. 
Part of the explanation for these variations was to be found in geographic 
location, the language difficulties, and the character of the firm. Those out- 
side the capita1 found it less easy to maintain regular access to the national 
government, but it should be noted that firms in the distant East Coast states 
were better informed on state matters than those in Selangor. Chinese firms 
reported finding it difficult because of the language barrier to understand 
government publications written in Malay or English o r  to  discuss issues 
with officials. Finally, the character of the firms is an important variable. 
Foreign multi-nationals or agency houses have developed long experience 
in gathering commercial data, and joint venture firms have often been 
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closely tied to  government programs or have been formed under official 
auspices. The Chinese firm has traditionally believed it to be wise to stay 
clear of government except when necessary. It has depended upon its asso- 
ciations or  third parties rather than officials. This attitude is changing, and 
Penang Chinese respondents reported a desire to gain better access to 
government, but were hobbled by lack of knowledge as t o  points of contact. 
PERSONAL CONTACT 
While we have noted the high degree of interest in data among large firms 
in Malaysia, the traditional picture of influence in Asia has been personal 
contact between businessmen and officials. It is here that we begin to see the 
evidence against the hypothesis that in Malaysia the interest group primarily 
attempts to influence the input functions of government. In the national 
survey of large firms, contacts with two types of government officials were 
investigated: I )  non-civil service, and 2) civil service or members of quasi- 
government authorities. The former would be considered those approached 
as political contacts, including federal and state ministers, members of 
parliament, ambassadors, or royalty. Slightly less than 50% of almost all 
categories had contact with this group, most notably with ministers, MPs, 
and state representatives (table 2). Interestingly, although foreign firms 
maintained closer touch with published data, they were significantly less 
TABLE 2 
CONTACT WITH NON-CIVIL SERVICE MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT 
(In percentages) 
Total Associ- 
Firms Local Fore~gn J o ~ n t  Chlnese Other Selangor Rest 
Have contact 45 71 49 32 48 46 47 40 52 
Donothavecon~act 55 29 51 68 52 54 53 60 48 
involved in political contacts. While the total percentage of firms with such 
contacts was 45% and associations displayed a high 71%, only 32% of 
foreign firms admitted to relationships of this kind. In this we can see a 
caution, probably combined with a lack of experience, in dealing with 
political figures in Malaysia. In any case, they were consistently less likely 
to deal with ministers, MPs, and state representatives informally than were 
other groups (no foreign firm wouId admit to informal entertaining of those 
specifically described as "politicians"). The type of interaction with MPs and 
senators, for example, was primarily through direct formal contact or letter 
(averaging 20% of all respondents) and informal entertainment (averaging 
12% of all firms, but ranging from 6% for foreign firms to 15% for joint 
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venture firms). Informal entertainment was the most notable means of 
contact with state representatives, but averaged 12% (from 3% with foreign 
firms to 14% for local firms). No category of those surveyed stated that 
contact with non-civil servants was very frequent, the majority saying it was 
less than once in six months.3 
Thus the data from this survey showed Iow contact with those political 
leaders responsible for the promulgation of laws and regulations. Less than 
25% of the firms or associations admitted to contact with MPs, for example. 
Several firms had MPs on their boards of directors, but the usual comment 
was that they had not proved "useful." While we may question the veracity 
of some of the answers, they do tend to validate the point that comparatively 
little public effort is made to influence the input functions of government in 
Malaysia. 
If, as we hypothesize, primary emphasis is on influencing the output 
functions of government, then contacts with civil servants and members of 
quasi-government authorities would be much higher. Care should be taken 
to avoid extrapolating too much from the figures that follow, since doing 
business in most countries entails frequent contact with government func- 
tionaries with regard to licenses, taxes, permits, etc. Still approximately twice 
as many firms reported contacts with civil servants and quasi-government 
officers as with political authorities. 
TABLE 3 
CONTACT WITH THE CIVIL SERVICE A N D  QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES 
(In percentages) 
Total Associ- 
Firms ations Local Foreign Joint Ch~nese Other Selangor Rest 
Have contact 93 93 93 94 94 92 95 93 94 
Do not have contact 7 7 7 6 6 8 5 7 6 
As can be seen from table 3, there was little variation among types of 
firms in the sample. Among firms in the Penang sample with fewer workers, 
a significantly smaller number of Chinese firms reported contact with civil 
servants, but the pattern was more a question of frequency of contact. Not 
only was there a more general reporting of contact with civil servants in the 
total sample, but also such contact was considerably more frequent than 
contact with politically-oriented individuals. 
COOPERATION WITH OTHER COMPANIES 
A final and important area of contact for those interested in influencing 
government is joint action among firms with common interests. This can 
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be particularly effective in affecting the input functions of government, as 
can be seen in the United States through the National Association of Manu- 
facturers, commodity associations, professional groups, and so forth. This 
was not a common practice in Malaysia, where less than a quarter of the 
firms reported such activities (see tabIe4). 
TABLE 4 
COOPERATION WITH OTHER COMPANIES ON GOVERNMENT MATTERS 
(In percentages) 
Total Assoa- 
Firms ations Local Fore~gn Joint Chinese Other Selangor Rest 
Cooperation 21 53 23 16 27 22 25 21 25 
Do not have 
cooperat~on 79 47 77 84 73 78 75 79 75 
The researchers were rather surprised at the low percentage of cooperation 
among associations, but the apparent result may be due to conscious false 
under-reporting. Many firms, however, reported privately that communal 
associations were not very effective, and poorer Penang firm managers 
noted that fees for the large manufacturing associations were too high-thus 
they did not attempt to join. 
As interesting were the types of firms with whom they reportedly co- 
operated. Only 10% of the firms in the national sample stated that they 
cooperated with companies in the same field, and no foreign firm so stated. 
The latter statement is particularly suspect, as in Penang the greatest co- 
operation in the area was among foreign electronics firms over problems 
with labor and government-provided infrastructure. Also notable is the fact 
that only one percent of the Chinese firms were prepared to state that they 
cooperated with associations. It is my view that this type of interaction was 
severely under-reported, perhaps because interviewees feared being charged 
with illegal collusion. 
When we attempted to  pursue the issue by asking if firms used non- 
governmental groups for assistance when they had an interest in a particular 
government activity, a somewhat different picture appeared. Approximately 
two-fifths of our respondents in the national sample answered affirmatively 
to the question, "More particularly when your company (org.) has an 
interest in a specific government activity, do you contact any nongovern- 
mental group for assistance?" Percentages ranged from 37% to 46%, except 
for Chinese firms, of which only 32% were willing t o  answer affirmatively. 
What emerges from this questioning of heads of firms is high awareness 
of government programs, infrequent contact with officials on the input side 
of government but considerable contact with administrators, low reported 
cooperation with other firms in influencing government but a rather high 
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percentage prepared to admit to the use of private go-betweens in dealing 
with specific government problems. We can conjecture that considerably 
more cooperation with other companies and contact with politicians takes 
place than was admitted to  the interviewers. 
RESULTS OF INFORMATION AND CONTACTS 
Two areas of results from information and contacts were investigated: 
the obtaining of government contracts and the question of self-efficacy, 
We wished to discover whether a particular type of organization was better 
informed, more aware and more capable of gaining the rewards of data 
and contacts than other types. First, approximately 27% of all firms directly 
or indirectly participate in federal government projects (see table 5), with 
a somewhat lower percentage involved in state projects (approximately 22%). 
TABLE 5 
PARTICIPATION N FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROJECTS 
(In percentages) 
Totat 
firms Local Foreign Joint Chinese Other Selangor Rest 
Directcurrent participation 21 19 16 31 16 18 25 12 
Indirect-reap benefits 6 6 13 2 4 9 4 7 
It is significant that firms owned by local Chinese and firms based in 
outlying areas have been less fortunate than others in securing government 
contracts, and that joint venture firms are more successful. In part, this is 
a result of official efforts to aid Malay firms and government participation 
in joint venture projects with foreign firms. The lower Chinese participation 
is also partially due to the fact that a significantly lower percentage of 
Chinese firms are aware of government projects (only 66% as against 87% 
for firms owned by other nationalities). As well, foreign firms have been 
reluctant to establish factories or develop contacts in outlying areas lacking 
adequate economicinfrastructure to sustain profitable activities. 
Finally, there is the question of self-efficacy, the perception by the firm 
management of its company's ability to  change government policies. The 
question asked the two hundred forty-five firms and associations was, 
"How effective do you believe that your company (org.) has been in gaining 
desired changes in government policies? 
Very effective? 
Quite effective? 
Somewhat ineffective? 
Ineffective? 
Never tried?" 
The majority reported their firms to be somewhat ineffective, to be ineffec- 
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tive, or as never having tried to influence government. The most effective 
in their own view were joint venture firms and the associations, along with 
respondents in some outlying states who apparently felt effective in dealing 
with local authorities (see table 6). 
TABLE 6 
SELF-PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS 
(In percentages) 
Total Assocl- 
firms Local Fore~gn Joint Chinese Other Selangor Rest 
- 
Very effective 6 12 4 6 11 4 9 4 8 
Qu~teeffect~ve 25 59 24 23 37 22 37 24 30 
Somewhateffect~ve 34 12 39 19 23 42 14 25 40 
Ineffect~ve 21 18 20 29 16 22 18 25 16 
Never t r~ed  15 0 13 23 13 10 22 22 6 
This was a rather remarkable admission of frustration on the part of a 
sample of the largest firms in Malaysia (similar results were gained from 
small firms in Penang). Among all groups of firms no types reported a 
majority feeling effective and in most cases the percentage was only about 
30 to 40%. 
One might ask whether there is a particular pattern of awareness, contact, 
and effectiveness among the groups concerned. An effort was made to see 
whether there was an interrelationship among these three variables and 
then to assess the composition of the groups concerned. A definite pattern 
did emerge. 
1. Those with the highest contacts with political leaders tended to be 
better informed, cooperated with other firms to a greater extent, and had 
higher self perceptions of success. This was particularly true regarding those 
who had more frequent contacts with ministers, MPs, and senators. A 
declining pattern was maintained across respondents categorized as having 
high, medium, and low contacts. 
2. Those who were able to participate directly or indirectly in federal 
government projects were more likely to be better informed and to cooperate 
with others, but there was no statistically significant difference between 
high and low respondents regarding contacts and perceptions of influence 
except that those with mediumcontacts tended to beless successful. 
3. Those firms using nongovernmental groups for assistance were more 
likely to be informed and to work with others, but there were not important 
differences in the other categories. 
4. Those with the highest perceptions of influence tended to be better 
informed, to have more frequent contacts with government, and to co- 
operate more with others. 
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REASONS FOR MEANS OF INFLUENCE 
We have noted the primary emphasis given to influencing the output as 
against the input elements of government in the Malaysian case. Our next 
task is to analyze the reasons for this pattern of influence. Fragmentary 
evidence from other Afro-Asian states tends to substantiate the style of 
interaction. Furthermore, we should comment that not all interest groups 
tend to act as does business in Malaysia, or elsewhere in Afro-Asia. Mass 
organizations, "official" groups such as civil servants and elements of 
political parties, as well as what have been called "whole life" interest groups 
(religious, racial, tribal, and communally oriented segments of society) may 
attempt to put pressure on the input functions of government, both within 
and without the system.4 We are concentrating in this paper, however, on 
private interest groups, and most particularly upon economic organizations; 
and in this narrower framework four major explanatory factors related to 
primary influence on the output functions appear to be the most important: 
1) attitudes toward interest group activity; 2) the precarious position of 
the private economic sector; 3) ownership of firms; and 4) other means of 
access to government. While all these elements are relevant in Malaysia, 
they have general validity for the rest of Afro-Asia, and are even more 
important in some other countries. 
1. Attirudes. M. Esman has strongly asserted that Malaysia's civil service 
finds interference by politicians and interest groups less than attractive.5 As 
in so many former colonies, the administrator in the past was the individual 
who both made the regulations and saw that they w&e followed. Rising 
business interests and political parties weresuspect. 
The danger civil servants see for Malaysla is that the petty and corrupt politics of aggressive 
individual and small-group interests may destroy both legitmate politics and a d m ~ n ~ s t r a -  
tion. . . . Malaysia's civil servants distrust the polltical process of pressure, influence, and 
expedient bargaining, and they distrust a s  well the political role.6 
In the case of Malaysia, large-scale manufacturing and commercial interests 
are relatively new (except for mines, plantations, and agency houses) and 
the economic and political role of large firms is still evolving.' 
Malaysian firms themselves believe that it is "improper7' for the private 
sector to attempt to influence the formulation of government policies. In 
interviews with Malaysian firm owners and managers, a number of re- 
spondents volunteered that they did not believe that firms should behave 
in this way. Not one respondent stated that he would attempt to engage in 
any pressure group activities to change the New Economic Policy, although 
a sizable minority were dissatisfied with some elements of the NEP.8 At the 
same time, firms stated their willingness to attempt to influence laws and 
regulations that would affect their firms and 8% of the respondents (mostly 
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local Chinese) commented that they did not intend fully implementing 
the NEP, anyway. 
In sum, attitudes of both civil servants and firms support a belief in the 
rightness of operating in an environment that generally precludes public 
efforts by private interest groups to influence government policies, but 
firms do attempt to get civil servants to interpret laws and regulations in 
their favor. 
2.  Role ofthe private sector. While the private sector is less vulnerable to 
government interference or seizure in Malaysia than in most Afro-Asian 
states, many intellectuals and politicians hold private enterprise in suspicion. 
The restrictive role of such suspicions is far more obvious in socialist 
countries, where the private sector is often considered as an unwelcome and 
sometimes temporary phenomenon, than in capitalist states. While ostensibly 
Malaysia is strongly in favor of the private sector, efforts to increase Malay 
ownership of the modern sector through the NEP and politically-oriented 
attacks on working conditions in factories have made non-Malay owned 
firms wary.9 These attacks have come from the traditional right and the 
small socialist left, both of which have harassed industrial firms. Such 
criticism leads to caution against acting in ways which might engender 
public outcries against "improper" interference in politics. 
3.  Ownership. Wariness is understandable in light of the racial and 
national composition of major firms in Malaysia. The modern sector of the 
economy is dominated by two major groups. The largest with respect to 
its share in investments is the foreign investor. A combination of British, 
Japanese, American, Hong Kong, Singaporean, and other foreign man- 
agers' and owners' activities controls approximately two-thirds of the 
modern economic sector of Malaysia. Even though these firms tend to pay 
higher wages and make efforts to meet the Malay employment quota 
standards of the NEP,10 they are frequently attacked by politicians and 
intellectuals. Given the now fashionable nature of criticism of multi- 
nationals in the third world, foreign companies are particularly careful 
not to appear to be interfering in Malaysia's political process. They do 
make vigorous efforts to get favorable treatment under the laws and often 
make representations to state and federal government over problems with 
infrastructure, visas, education for expatriate children, etc. Also, birthdays 
of national leaders bring large advertisements of congratulations and 
annual reports at times include praise of the country's political elite. 
The other major group is the local Chinese, who are active at all levels 
of the economy, particularly in tin production, construction, and com- 
mercial enterprises from small family-based firms to large financial insti- 
tutions. In spite of the statistically smaller role of the Chinese in the modern 
sector, as compared with foreigners (less than 30%), the majority of the 
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Malay community perceives them as dominating the local economy. In 
part this is because smaller Chinese firms are in more immediate contact 
with the poorer Malays, engaged as they are in small commercial activities 
such as stores, rice mills, theaters, restaurants, and so on. In the initial 
years of independence there was general agreement that the Malays would 
control the political and administrative life of the country while the Chinese 
would dominate the commercial sector. Since the racially-oriented riots 
of May 1969, the Malaysian political elite has sought to bring the Malays 
into the modern sector through government efforts. The stated goal is to 
have the Chinese and Indians own 40%, foreigners 30%, and Malays 30% 
of the modern enterprises. While no group is supposed to have total invest- 
ments decline (because of expected economic growth), the largest increase 
is to be among the Malay, who now own approximately 2%. The corn- 
bination of Malay perceptions of Chinese dominance and government 
programs to expand Malay participation in the economy makes the Chinese 
economic community careful about public political activity. 
A further reason for caution among the Chinese has been a tendency 
for Chinese business to consider that political activities are not desirable. 
For many years the Chinese did not have full rights of citizenship and 
some Chinese felt themselves only temporary residents. Neither of these 
factors is now particularly relevant, but they have colored the attitudes of 
older Chinese merchants. This is especially true of the more traditional 
entrepreneurs who are not fully familiar with the new political-bureaucratic 
system. 
It should be emphasized that neither the foreign nor the Chinese economic 
community is as vulnerable to attack as in most other South or Southeast 
Asian states. MaIaysia remains eager to encourage foreign investment and 
offers a variety of incentives for industries considered desirable by the gov- 
ernment. Also, the size of the Chinese population (approximately 37%) and 
efforts to establish a multi-national political system make them considerably 
more secure than most of their neighboring counterparts. These factors do 
not, however, make them invulnerable to attack from politicians across the 
political spectrum. 
4. Access. We have noted a hesitancy to employ Western-style public 
interest group activities. In part this is due to opportunities to develop more 
private means of influence including personal contacts, putting prominent 
Malaysians on boards of directors, financial support, etc. These allow the 
knowledgeable firm representative to obtain government support through 
unobtrusive means. It should be emphasized that this pattern is far less 
important than in other Southeast Asian states such as Thailand, the Philip- 
pines, and Indonesia, where in previous years private financial "arrange- 
ments" between the public and private sectors were flagrant. In Thailand, 
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prior to the 1973 government change, it was normal practice for Chinese 
firms to put civil and military officials on their boards for the purposes of 
both protection and access. In Malaysia non-public contacts between the 
public and private sectors remain an important means of getting across the 
firm's point of view, but less frequently and with considerably less corruption 
than has been present in other Southeast Asian states. To the degree that 
such access is available, however, the "normal" means of pressure group 
activity is not necessary. 
In sum, then, most large Malaysian firms find the American style of 
interest group politics dangerous, unattractive, or unnecessary. Their inter- 
national or racial composition puts them in too vulnerable a position to 
participate publicly in influencing major government programs, even though 
government may have a significant impact on their business activities. It is 
only when the very existence of the firm is threatened that it moves into the 
public arena, and examples of such activities are rare. Moreover, the better 
managed firms have found public efforts to influence the input functions of 
government less vitally necessary than might be expected. The firm maintains 
regular means of obtaining knowledge of government policies and regula- 
tions, is in frequent contact with elements of the civil service, and has often 
found other, less public, means of obtaining redress of grievances. 
The aforementioned pattern of interest group policies should not be taken 
to mean that firms are completely pleased with present arrangements. On the 
whole, however, they have been able to operate successfully in Malaysia 
with acceptable profits and less danger of expropriation than in most other 
South or Southeast Asian states. It should also be noted that the major 
complaints voiced by firms have been either incapable of redress through 
public action or not of a nature necessitating pressure on the administration. 
As an example, the major objection to the Malay quota system for employ- 
ment cannot be openly attacked because of a constitutional prohibition 
against raising racial issues. On the other hand, the almost universal com- 
plaint against government red tape cannot easily be solved through parlia- 
mentary action, if it can be ameliorated at alI.11 
Finally, it is doubtful that this pattern of influence will change radically 
in the future. Firms feel increasingly vulnerable to political attack and the 
government is actively attempting to increase its own involvement in industry. 
Politicians now find baiting foreign and Chinese owned firms to be politically 
rewarding, and even greater caution is proving necessary now than previously. 
Nationalism is growing in Malaysia to add to difficulties, and government 
efforts to increase Malay ownership in the modern sector through buying 
into large companies raises the specter of future expropriation. All of this 
limits pressure on the input functions of government and demands greater 
reliance on employing influence on the output functions. 
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NOTES 
I Of firms Interviewed the following samples were obtained. 
A. Local 152, forelgn 3 1, joint ownership 62; 
B. Selangor 121, Northern states 59, Negri Sembilan and Malacca 19, Jahore 27, East Coast 19; 
C Chineseownership or  associations 158, other 87; 
D Primary Products 42, Western T r a d ~ n g  20, Asian Trading 43, Food Manufacturing 22, 
Engineering 22, Other Manufacturers 36, Services 19, F~nance  24. 
2. The NEP is a recent Malays~atl government program which seeks to eradicate poverty 
and raise the economic and soclal standards of the Malay. See F. R. von der Mehden, "Com- 
munalism, Industrial Pol~cy and Income Distribution In Malaysia," Asran Sutvev IS, No. 3 
(March, 1975): 250-261. 
3. The small percentage of Selangor firms is due to the large number of foreign firms based 
there. 
4 Studies in other developing countries haveshown the Importance of mass organlzatlons. 
See, for example, J. Sllversteln, "Burmese and Malays~an Student Pollt~cs," Journal o f  Soulh- 
east Asian St~rdres 1, No. 1 (March, 1970): 3-22; J. R. Gusfield, "Political Community and 
Group Interests In Modern Indla," Paeijc Aflarrs 38, No. 2 (Summer, 1965): 123-141; T. 
Manirurwanam, "Group Interests in Paklstan Polit~cs, 1947-58," Paelfie Affarrs 39, Nos. I and 
2 (Sprlng-Summer, 1966): 83-98. 
5. M. Esman, Adtnmrstration and Development In MaIaj7~io (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, l972),pp. 124-128. 
6. Ibid. pp. 125-126. 
7. In 1938 there were only 77 manufacturing concerns in the Federated Malay States 
employing more than ten workers, and in the Unfederated Malay States about 300 of all sizes 
and kinds, mostly producing for the local market. Kate M~tchell, /ndu~trralrzaiiotz of [he 
Wesrern Pacfrc (New York. IPR, 1942), pp. 184-187. This grew to  Secondary Industry firms 
totalling 139,619 employees In 1947 and 203,516 in 1957. The majority of flrms, however, still 
employed less than 10 workers in 1957. E. L. Wheelwnght. "Industriali?ation in Malaya," in 
The Pohi~cal Econonly of Independent Mala,,a, ed. T.  H .  Silcock (Berkeley, Calif.: Un~versity 
of California Press, 1963). 
8. In part this reluctance 1s due to  constitut~onal restrictions prohibiting attacks on basic 
assumptions upon whlch the Malaysianstate is now founded. 
9. See von der Mehden, "Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income Distribution in 
Malaysia." 
10. The government has attempted to establish a policy of having f ~ r m s  reflect the national 
composttion of the population at  all levels. In practice this has meant efforts to install 40% 
quotasfor Malays at  least below themanagement level. I b ~ d .  
I I. Interestingly enough, spokesmen In company headquarters abroad 'are far more favor- 
ably impressed w ~ t h  the ease of doing bus~ness in Malaysia than are local managers. In part, this 
IS due to  more difficult problems in other countries and the distance from the nitty-gritty 
difficult~es met by managersin the field. 
